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I. Introduction  
 
During periods of recession and economic crises our economic well-being 
deteriorates in many familiar ways. Unemployment, stagnant wages and a growth of the 
informal sector are usually coupled with government budgetary cuts. Faced with 
increased economic insecurity, people are “silently” called upon to expand their 
production work within household care economy, filling thus the gaps that market 
retrenchment and decrease in government provisioning create. As numerous studies have 
demonstrated by now, the burden of adjustment is not gender-neutral; rather, women, 
especially in poor households  disproportionately shoulder this burden (Lourdes Beneria 
and Shelley Feldman 1991; Pamela Sparr 1993; Nilufer Cagatay, Diane Elson and Caren 
Grown 1995; UN 1999). 
 
One important dimension of the impact of economic fluctuations on economic 
well-being that has remained less visible is the change in the level and composition of 
household assets. Under economic duress, people are prone to sell or pawn assets they 
possess in order to survive or to help smoothen their consumption. This too, it will be 
argued, is not a gender-neutral phenomenon. If so, then economic hardship, whether 
brought about by individual misfortune or by macroeconomic processes, is likely to 
affect men and women differently. This paper, which uses a sample of 270 individuals 
drawn from a survey of 152 households in three low-income communities in Bangkok, 
will show that asset depletion among urban poor households in Thailand exhibits a 
gender specific pattern.  
 
Such a differentiated effect has the potential of creating trajectories that magnify 
the gender gap above and beyond the immediate time grid of the crisis. First, the upturn 
may find women with a sizable depletion of a particular class of tangible assets, that 
which enabled them in the first place to participate as self-employed workers. A second 
possible effect is also of importance. Given the low level of asset ownership among poor 
households, it may be the case that even small, newly created, asymmetries between men 
and women due to asset depletion lower substantially women’s “voice”.  Ill equipped and 
shortchanged, women may be disadvantaged or unable to partake in any recovery.  
 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to especially thank Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, Anant Pichetpongsa and the staff 
of HomeNet Thailand for their invaluable input in the survey and for providing us with insights on the 
gender norms and on asset market dynamics among urban households in Thailand. The Levy Economics 
Institute and Vassar College have provided us with logistical and technical support in writing the paper. 
Asena Caner, Thomas Hungerford and Christopher Kilby gave us good feedback and were generous with 
their time in giving helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, the authors want to acknowledge Lisa 
Wong for her assistance in the data processing. 
  1This paper joins in the recent efforts in the literature  ( Cheryl Doss 1996; Carmen 
Diana Deere and Magdalena Leon 2001; Agnes Quisumbing and B. de la  Briere 2000; 
Nancy Jianakoplos and Alexandra Bernasek 1996) to investigate gender differences in 
asset ownership and depletion. In particular, we explore analytically and empirically this 
type of gender inequality among urban couples of poor households in a developing 
country, Thailand.  The paper seeks to explore the following: 1) is there a gendered 
pattern of asset ownership among husbands and wives; 2) during times of crises, is there 
a gendered pattern of asset depletion; and 3) does asset depletion affect men and women 
differently in regards to their income earning capabilities?  
 
Answers to these questions are especially important as they shed light on the form 
of coping mechanisms poor households adopt but also on the differential impact such 
strategies have on women and men. The latter is of significance in understanding intra-
household bargaining and power processes. As Amartya Sen’s “missing women” brought 
into sharp focus, being poor does not warrant equitable access to the few available 
opportunities and entitlements nor evenhandedness in the sharing of burdens and 
reproductive unpaid labor (Amartya Sen 1999). 
 
 
A. The Role of Assets in Economic Well Being 
 
 
It has been argued by feminist economists that any economic inquiry should be 
done around the concept of the provisioning of human life
2. Accordingly, the economy 
can be conceptualized as providing the necessities and conveniences people need in order 
to nurture and develop their human capabilities (such as food, education, sanitation, 
childcare, healthcare and housing). The provisioning of these needs may occur through 
market work, unpaid household work and volunteer work as well as through the 
government. Economic production that satisfies the material needs of human beings, 
therefore, takes place in four interconnected sectors namely, in the household sector, the 
government (public) sector, the volunteer sector and the market sector. If one were to ask 
“who gets how much” and “which economic sector provides”  these necessities and 
conveniences,  one would find extreme variations and asymmetries on the basis of one’s 
country, class, ethnicity, gender and race. 
 
The focus of this paper is on a particular gender asymmetry  that, in our view, 
deserves more attention, namely household asset accumulation and depletion. Economic 
well being is determined not only by material consumption level but also by the security 
or risk of maintaining the same level in the future. Thus, any inquiry on well being must 
take into account the pattern of asset accumulation due to the important role of assets, 
both financial and tangible, in future earnings and in consumption smoothing. Since 
households are non-unitary, we also need to understand the gendered pattern of asset 
ownership and depletion in households.  
 
                                                 
2 See Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson 1993; Nilufer Cagatay, Diane Elson and Caren Grown 1995.  
  2Accumulated assets may serve as a means of luxury consumption and enjoyment. 
Often, they serve as resources that can generate income other than what is earned through 
employment. This is the case of productive, financial and tangible assets that yield a rate 
of return in the form of interest, profits or rent. Likewise, assets can serve as a buffer to 
help smooth consumption often referred to as precautionary savings.  
 
Accumulation of financial assets is rare among poor households. Most of their 
assets are tangible, usually in the form of  basic durable household items such as 
refrigerator or television, and  investment goods used for income generating activities 
such as sewing machine, vendor cart and ice chest. Thus, precautionary saving among the 
poor may take on the guise of tangible assets, either because financial services are 
inaccessible or because this specific form of asset enables the owner to have direct 
control over its use.  
 
During precarious economic times,  the importance of assets, both as a source of 
income and as a buffer, becomes magnified.  Under harsh conditions, one would expect 
the second role – that of consumption smoothing –  to dominate over the first one.  The 
subsequent liquidation of an asset, particularly one that is used for income generation, 
tends to increase the vulnerability of the household. The pawning of a sewing machine, 
for instance, may suggest the end of home based subcontracting work; a rickshaw or a 
stove, if sold, may imply a drastic reduction in income, forcing the family to shifts from 
near poverty status to one of starvation. 
 
Ownership, access to, and control
3 over decisions on how to use accumulated 
assets (financial and non-financial ones) have a direct impact on a person’s economic 
status, autonomy, and economic well-being.  Differences in asset holdings matter 
especially if asset holding influences not only status or increased bargaining power within 
the household, but also a person’s ability to earn income. In Thailand, for example, 
women comprise the majority  of the self –employed particularly in the informal sector 
(Anant Pichetpongsa, 2004; Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, 2004) and therefore have a 
greater need for productive assets, more so than men.  It follows that asset depletion is 
likely to have a differentiated impact on women and men’s future earning capacity.   
 
Among couples, tangible assets may be pooled/jointly owned or individually 
owned. In those cases where assets are pooled, the issue of bargaining and negotiation in 
the use of assets for women’s enterprises becomes relevant. But when assets are not 
pooled, the question of whose assets are used for consumption smoothing and in what 
proportion becomes pertinent.  If women’s assets are depleted more often than those of 
men and women have greater need for productive assets given the nature of their 
employment, then the impact of asset depletion is likely to be greater on women’s ability 
to earn income than on men’s. In other words, loss of productive assets will have a 
deleterious effect on the household. But on a woman, it will have two specific effects; it 
will remove the very basis of self-employment and her ability to generate income and it 
                                                 
3 The complexity of the idea that ownership of an asset does not immediately translate into control over its 
use is explored in Bina Agarwal (1994) and Naila Kabeer (1999)  
  3will decrease her bargaining power because both her income will disappear at the present 
time and her future prospects to generate income will have diminished.  
 
Although gender based differences in asset ownership may be due to customary 
inheritance or state laws, they are likely to be influenced by differences in earnings and 
levels of job security. One also needs to consider gender role effects, which may likely 
account for differences in priorities and motivations that men and women have when it 
comes to saving, spending and accumulating. The gendered effect of economic 
fluctuations on asset ownership can be therefore attributed not only to the division of 
labor and external economic shocks but also to a host of norms that govern property 
relationships. Norms that are imposed as well as those fully internalized by men and 
women affect the pattern of accumulation as well as depletion of assets. 
 
 
B. Rethinking the Meaning of Assets in the Context of Poverty 
  
One of the ideas widely ascribed to within feminist economics is the context 
specific validity and the non-neutrality of economic categories that we use everyday and 
in conducting research (Julie Nelson 2003; Cagatay, Elson and Grown, 1995).  Our study 
of  asset ownership among women and men in urban poor households in Thailand points 
out that identical  physical characteristics of an asset may correspond to very different 
functions that the asset plays in one community versus another, thus defying standard 
notions or categories in the field of Economics. 
 
In particular, our findings invite some rethinking of the savings- investment 
(goods) -(durable) consumption goods- nexus. These may  be viewed as either discrete 
and detached entities or as a continuum in which case the mutually exclusive nature of 
these categories become somewhat blurred. Among poor households, for example, 
stockpiles of cans of food intended for resale, originally an investment, become a  
“liquid” tangible household asset that can be used for consumption smoothing purposes.  
 
Savings also can take the form of “luxury” consumption such as a  television set 
or a radio which at the surface may seem extravagant for a very poor household. But 
television sets and radios can be easily pawned and used as collateral since the very poor 
coexist with folk at near poverty and less worse off who readily provide demand for such 
items. They are also a much safer and useful form of savings in the face of currency 
devaluation and/or lack of access to banking services.  Other forms of savings such as 
jewelry for example, can be an embodiment of differential control dictated by prevailing 
norms (Siwan Anderson and Jean-Marie Baland 2001). Indeed, the social relations within 
which these assets are accumulated and, above all, their intended use define the form and 
manner of asset ownership. 
 
III.  Empirical Analysis  
 
The above discussion suggests that there are gender-related issues that lead to 
differentiated patterns of asset ownership and asset depletion by women and men. At the 
  4same time, we have suggested that the intended use of these savings and assets influences 
their asset selection. Poverty, job insecurity as well as control over asset use are likely 
key factors that determine the asset composition and levels held by urban poor women 
and men. 
 
The data we use in this paper are both quantitative and qualitative. This 
information is drawn from a random sample of 152 urban, low-income households in 
Bangkok (Thailand) in 2002
4. The multi-purpose survey includes information at the level 
of the individual respondent on  accumulated tangible or physical assets  as well as the 
status of those owned assets six months later. Thus, data are provided for total owned 
assets and the ratio of pawned or sold assets to total assets owned at the beginning of the 
period. For our purposes, we focus our investigation on a sub-sample of 135 couples 
households, with and without dependents. (See Appendix A for characteristics of total 
sample households).  Both husband and wife were interviewed separately and the data 
gathered from the multi-visit interviews include pertinent household and individual 
information (see Appendix B), employment, credit  as well as household decision making 
issues, division of tasks and earnings allocation for various expenses. 
 
The average household monthly income for the sub-sample couples data set is 
roughly 15,553 Thai Baht, or equivalent of $353.  (Appendix A) The mean age of the 
sample respondents are around 42 years old. Women survey respondents, on average, 
attend 5.42 years in the Thailand school system, compared to men’s (6.73 years). The 
average individual monthly work income   is 6,380 Baht, or equivalent to $152,  with 
women earning less  on average (4, 885 Baht) than men (7, 969 Baht). (See Appendix B).  
In terms of employment status, a greater proportion of men were engaged in formal 
sector, regular wage employment than women. Women, on the other hand, tend to be 
employed more as contracted or casual home-based workers and as self-employed in the 
informal sector, compared to men. 
 
A. Gendered Patterns in the Composition and Level of  Assets 
 
1.  Ownership of Real Assets 
 
Our empirical study will focus on the total physical or tangible assets  held jointly and 
separately by heads of households and spouses, within each household in the Thailand 
sample. These consist of the following  categories: land (in the rural areas), housing, 
household appliances, jewelry (especially gold), shop or business assets (e.g. sewing 
machines, barber, leather or jewelry making tools, machine equipment, etc) and transport 
vehicles (e.g. vending cart, bicycles, truck or car). Interestingly, although more than half 
                                                 
4 The data used for our analysis were collected in three urban poor communities in Bangkok during June - 
September 2002 by American University researchers in cooperation with HomeNet, Thailand, a network of 
women’s and community development organizations. The sample is random in that every sixth household 
in the community roster (most recent) list was chosen for the interview. The selection of the low income 
communities was based on the following three criteria: a) representativeness of the population in the 
Bangkok Metropolitan area, b) presence of informal sector workers particularly home-based ones, and c) 
contacts with the community leaders and/or members who can help facilitate our entry into the community 
and the survey of its residents. 
  5of the sample households own the dwelling that they occupy, only a small proportion 
reported the current house dwelling as an asset. Household appliances, jewelry, shop or 
business-related assets, e.g. tools, sewing machine and transport vehicles comprise what 
is referred physical or real assets .   
 
An important caveat to note is that there are both joint as well as individually held 
assets. There is a general  absence of well-defined property rights among urban poor 
households in Thailand.  Although the concept of ownership was explained to the 
respondents prior to the saving and asset interviews, the majority of those interviewed 
had not even thought of the issue of ownership seriously. Hence, sole or joint ownership 
of an asset e.g. appliance, land or housing was based primarily on their perception. The 
informality of the economy in which many of the poor conduct their day-to-day affairs 
also implies that the issue of ownership cannot be established solely on the basis of legal 
contracts or proof of ownership.
5  
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
Table 1 shows the participation or ownership rate of physical or real assets by 
men and women in urban, poor households. Assets that are individually owned include 
jewelry, shop/business assets (in cases of  single owner business) and most vehicles. 
Assets that were jointly owned by the head and spouse include land, housing, appliances 
and some means of transport.
6 There is higher ownership rate of jewelry and business-
related assets by women while men have higher ownership rate in transport or vehicle 
assets. These results may be explained by the nature of employment or income earning 
activities that these respondents were engaged. While a very small proportion of women 
(0.7%) are not currently employed, majority of them (92.7%)  work in the informal 
sector, mostly as subcontracted or temporary home-workers , others as self-employed . 
The latter typically are involved in small, mobile shops or business enterprises that 
involved some fixed capital e.g. sewing machine, tools, food vending cart, etc. In 
contrast,  68.9% of men respondents in the same households work in the formal sector as 
regular workers. 
 
The mean value of total real assets owned by women, whether pooled or not, is higher 
than that owned by men, although in terms of median value, women’s real assets are 
lower compared to men’s. The difference in the distribution of specific types of assets 
among the poor reflects the variations in the depth of poverty that different groups of 
poor people experience and the importance of understanding  the processes through 
which individuals and households become or remain poor. 
 
 
                                                 
5 In sum, the responses to the survey questions reflected both the informal basis of ownership (e.g. “I 
bought this vehicle or watch with my own business earnings”) and the respondent’s perception in terms of 
his/her access to and control over the use of the asset (“we both live in this house therefore we both own 
it”). 
6 Valuation of joint assets were reported by the head and spouse separately; any (slight) difference in the 
reported value reflects the difference in their estimations. 
  62.  Patterns of Asset Depletion by Pawning or Selling. 
 
The prevalence of durable goods assets and their intended use –that of smoothing 
consumption or meeting specific household expenses-  raises several interesting 
observations.  First,  the standard notion that real or tangible assets are less convertible, 
illiquid and less divisible compared to financial or intangible assets  does not necessarily 
hold. Convertibility, liquidity and divisibility  are considered important properties of 
financial assets that make them clearly desirable, only when financial systems provide 
services that are easily accessible and are suited to the needs of the general population. 
 
The frequency of turnover or relatively shortness of the period in which tangible or 
real assets are held by poor households in the survey demonstrates  that certain assets can 
and do serve the function that financial assets typically provide, namely to make 
payments at relatively little cost or delay.  Secondary markets for used vehicles, jewelry, 
watches and appliances tend to be prevalent in low income areas so  that there are enough 
suitable buyers who can be located promptly. As a result, such assets can be sold 
immediately or serve as collateral that can be pawned. As it turns out,  the seller 
experienced relatively minimal loss of value and oftentimes did not engage in costly and 
time-consuming search. In the case of pawning, however, the pawnee often lose 
significant value in return for keeping the option of  redeeming the asset. 
 
Second, people in poverty, who have small amounts of savings to begin with, choose 
to hold assets that can serve a dual purpose – present consumption and  precautionary 
savings. The desirability of tangible or real assets such as jewelry and appliance, as 
oppose to intangible or financial assets, is that  they function as store of value that can be 
converted into cash to meet future consumption and at the same time, help meet present 
consumption needs. In the case of  transport vehicles and business/tools, these assets 
serve both current investment and (precautionary) saving purposes. The clear distinction 
made between consumption and savings categories  does not seem to apply in the case of  
assets among the poor and therefore, consumption and saving cannot be viewed as polar 
opposites. 
 
  [Table 2 about here.] 
 
Family members of urban poor households in Thailand, particularly women, 
transform or convert  certain physical assets they own into money frequently. Table 2 
brings into focus the pawning rate and asset depletion in the subsample.  We can observe 
from the data that  women pawn or sell their real assets more so than men do. This leads 
to a decline in their assets, both in absolute and relative terms. Women pawn their 
jewelry assets three times as much as men. Even more importantly, shop-assets are 
pawned or sold almost exclusively by women.  We find no gender-based  difference in 
the depletion of appliances and transportation vehicles assets, however since these 
comprise some of the tangible assets jointly owned by husband and wife in the 
household. 
   
[Table 3  about here.] 
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There are several reasons why men and women  pawn or sell their  assets. These 
include: a) for food and household emergency repairs,  b) education expense, c) family or 
special event, d) migration, and  e) other reasons.  Overall, as Table 3 shows, the majority 
of the assets that was either sold or pawned were for food, education and some family 
event, e.g., funeral, wedding, etc. We conjecture  that the gender ascription of women as 
the primary caretakers of households leads them to internalize their responsibility of 
household maintenance in terms of raising the necessary cash to meet subsistence needs. 
This task is even made more onerous when economic and employment conditions bring 
about greater job insecurity and earnings uncertainty. 
 
In the case of Thailand, the effects of the 1998 financial crisis had lingered in 
terms of greater informalization of employment and increased volatility in earnings.  
Accumulation of assets is therefore done with the expectation that these assets can and 
will be used in the not-too-distant future for consumption smoothing.  Another plausible 
reason is that, in cases where negotiation and bargaining between head and spouse had 
occurred, the household head, typically men, would have a greater say in whose assets (or 
savings) should be used first. Women pawn or sell their jewelry more often  for food 
provisioning of their family, at one and a half times than  men do;  for their children’s 
education at nearly twice men’s rate, and for family events, at two times the rate men do. 
(see Table 3). Overall, the rate of  asset depletion, defined as the share of pawned or sold 
real asset to total owned asset, is higher among women than men as shown in Table 4.  
 
[Table 4 about here.] 
 
The following section empirically examines the varied factors that may affect the 
gendered pattern of asset depletion and whether there are any significant differences in 
asset depletion  between men and women in the same households.  This gender 
differentiated pattern is important because it is reasonable to assume that asset ownership 
impacts on the individual’s, particularly the woman’s, sense of independence and on 
his/her economic well-being.  
 
B. The Determinants of Asset Depletion Rate  
 
The extent to which a member of the household depletes his/her assets depends on 
a variety of household and individual characteristics as well as social factors. These 
include household composition, social or gender norms which are manifested in gender 
roles performed by the individual within the household as well as factors that may affect 
the person’s decision making power. We perform in this section of the paper two 
econometric tests namely: 1) a Tobit analysis in determining the rate of asset depletion, 
and 2) a Probit analysis in determining the probability of pawning or selling a business-
related asset as well as real assets. 
 
Prevailing social and gender norms influence the pattern of asset rate of depletion. 
Although the labor force participation of women  in low-income households tends to be 
nearly as high as that of men, market work is still perceived to be the primary role of men 
  8(Anant Pichetpongsa 2004, Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, 2004) and that of household 
maintenance and childcare to be women’s principal work domain. These distinct social 
constructs imply that women, in striving to meet their household maintenance and 
caregiver roles, are more likely to sell or pawn their assets for consumption smoothing 
and to meet special household needs.  
 
Household composition, particularly the presence of children, may also play an 
important role in the rate of asset depletion.  Given the intensive nature of children’s 
expenses particularly education, demands on asset resources when schooling starts may 
be high, increasing the likelihood of selling or pawning one’s assets. Educational 
attainment is yet another factor that may influences an individual’s tendency to sell or 
pawn asset.  Those with more education may have  higher expectations in terms of their 
children’s future or in terms of meeting minimum consumption needs, even when 
incomes are low. 
 
The importance of social networks needs to be taken into account as well.  Some 
communities tend to maintain stronger social and community ties than others, creating a 
tendency for work sharing and extended family networks that provide assistance to a 
household.  The absence or weakening of such ties or mutual assistance mechanisms in 
more individual-oriented neighborhoods suggests a greater compulsion for those 
households to either rely on their own members’ labor or owned assets during times of 
need. 
    
In the absence of any substantial public transfers or social safety nets, e.g., 
pensions or public healthcare, private transfers such as remittances may also influence the 
rate of asset depletion.  As private transfers such as remittances increases, the incidence 
of pawning or selling of asset  is likely to decrease.   
 
At the same time, an individual’s contribution to household earnings  may 
influence her/his relative bargaining position in the household—particularly in those 
areas that are subject to negotiation ( Susan Fleck 1998, Bina Agarwal 1994, Martha 
Roldan 1988).  Whose asset is sold or pawned during time of need  may be an area more 
open to negotiation than decisions such as choice of residence, etc.  When an individual 
contributes a larger share of income to the household, he/she potentially wields greater 
influence. 
 
The rate to which an individual will sell or pawn his/her asset, Pij, is influenced 
by the above factors and is expressed in the following reduced form equation: 
*





ij if   > 0
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    (2) 
Xij and Zj are vectors of observable characteristics at the individual and household levels 
respectively, which influence the rate of asset depletion. Both β and γ are unknown 
parameters to be estimated.  The random error term, εij, has two components: 
 
εij  = ηj   + µij     (3) 
 
 where ηj is the unobserved household-specific effect, and  µij a random individual term 
uncorrelated with the household error component.  Since our data contains both husbands 
and wives, the error terms are not independent across individuals leading to biased 
standard errors for the coefficient estimates.  Consequently, we obtain unbiased estimates 
of variance by calculating robust (Huber/White) standard errors. 
 
The individual-level independent variables, X ij, in the Tobit Model I are the following: a) 
gender (Female), b) educational attainment represented by years of schooling and c) a 
proxy for the individual’s bargaining power namely, the individual’s income contribution 
to household income.
7 The household-specific variables, Zj include: a) household 
composition, particularly the number of children, b) total household educational 
expenses, c) private transfers and d) social and gender norms prevailing in the household 
represented by the dummy variables for  whose earnings are used for household 
expenses. The latter serve as a proxy for gender/social norms that may influence income 
allocation patterns. Two other variables are added namely a dummy for whether the 
pawned or sold assets are jointly owned or not. Another dummy represents community 
neighborhood sites. 
 
[Table 5 about here.] 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 5. As expected, the gender 
coefficient is significant and shows  that women in the urban low income households tend 
to deplete their assets at a faster rate than men by 26.3 percentage points.
8  The rate of 
asset depletion tends to increase by 64.2 percentage points if assets are jointly owned. 
The marginal impact of the proxy variables for social/gender norms  show that the rate of 
asset depletion increases significantly by 38 percentage points if  the earnings of the 
individual solely is used for household expenses and by 27.9 percentage points if joint 
earnings are used. Educational attainment and household educational expenses as well as 
proxy for bargaining power, on the other hand,  did not seem to have any significant 
                                                 
7  There may be potential endogeneity between the rate of asset depletion and the individual’s earnings 
share of household income if the rate of asset depletion affects the level of income of the individual. 
 
8  The marginal effects estimates are very close to the regression coefficients in the Tobit model. They are 
calculated at the mean values of the independent variables. 
  10effect on the dependent variable. This may be partly due to the generally low levels of 
schooling among workers in our sample.  
 
Two Probit  models are estimated next in order to determine the effects of  
various individual and household characteristics on the probability of pawning or selling 
real assets (Model II)  and more specifically, business-related assets (Model III). In 
addition to the individual and household characteristics, e.g., a) gender, b) educational 
attainment, c) private transfers (remittances), d) household composition (number of kids), 
and e) social/gender norms (whose earnings are used for food), e) other daily household 
expenses) and f) the individual share of household earnings, we add two exogenous 
variables namely. These variables, namely: g) business ownership type and h) degree of 
informality of the job, attempt to capture the specific circumstances that additionally 
motivate or enable the individual to pawn or sell his/her asset. Persons who own their 
business solely are likely to have a greater need for real assets, whether as collateral for 
loans or as productive assets that can be directly used as durable capital, e.g., sewing 
machines or vendor carts. Thus one would expect that the probability of pawning or 
selling a real asset, specifically a business related asset, is lower for them. Employment 
that is highly informal or less secure is likely to increase income fluctuations and 
therefore leads to greater need for resources to smoothen the  household consumption.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results for Probit Models II and III.  In both 
models, the significant gender dummy coefficients show that women have a higher 
probability of pawning a real asset as well as a business asset, compared to men. The 
informality of jobs, educational attainment and private transfers do not seem to have any 
significant effect on the dependent variable as with the number of children and proxy for 
bargaining power. Owning one’s business solely,  however, seems to increase the 
probability of pawning or selling a business-related asset, by 16.5 percentage points.
9  
The results in Table 6 also show that the pattern of earnings use has a significant effect 
on pawning or selling an asset probability. If the individual makes use of his/her own 
earnings for daily household expenses such as food, then the probability increases by 
31.2 and 23.0 percentage points  in Model II and Model III estimations  respectively. The 
marginal effects are significant but slightly smaller if joint earnings were used, with 20.9 
and 15.9 percentage points in Model II and III estimations respectively. 
 
C. Effect of Asset Depletion on Earnings 
 
Among Thailand’s urban, low-income population, women tend to comprise the 
majority of the self-employed in the informal sector and therefore have a greater need for 
access to real assets for credit collateral and for income-generating productive assets, 
more so than men. Therefore, in some sense they need to accumulate and hold more 
assets in order for them to contribute directly to household income. It therefore follows 
                                                 
9 Note that, as with the Tobit analysis, the coefficient estimates in probit models do not reflect the marginal 
effects. The latter are computed and discussed in the text. The marginal effects are evaluated at the mean 
values of the independent variables. 
  11that asset depletion is likely to have a differentiated impact on women and men’s future 
earning capacity. When women’s assets are depleted more often than those of men, this is 
likely to have a greater impact on women’s ability to earn income, compared to men. 
This is also likely to result in further erosion of their future bargaining power over and 
above what the loss of assets would directly bring.  
 
Ideally, an examination of the relationship between change in earnings and asset 
depletion requires data on individual earnings in at least two periods. The cross-sectional 
nature of the data in this study presents a serious limitation, however. To overcome this 
data constraint, we make use of the respondent’s answer as to whether his/her  current (or 
in the past week) profit earnings are lower, higher or the same as in previous months.  
This provides a rough proxy to the direction of change in the level of earnings of the 
individual.  We perform two probit analyses using the probability of low profits as the 
dependent variable and pertinent individual, employment and household characteristics as 
independent variables. The latter include gender, educational attainment, employment 
informality dummy, business ownership type and number of children. In addition, we 
include access to loans and the value of depleted business assets in Model II and the 
value of depleted real asset in Model III.
10
 
[Table 7 about here.] 
 
The results in Table 7 show that only the value of depleted business assets and the 
value of total depleted real assets have any significant positive effect. Calculating the 
marginal effects, the regression results show that an increase in the value of depleted 
business assets increases the probability of low profits by 0.39 percentage point while an 
increase in the value of depleted real assets increases the probability by 0.30 percentage 
point.  
 
III Concluding Remarks 
 
The preceding discussion sought to explore the following: 1) is there a gendered 
pattern of asset ownership between husbands and wives; 2) during times of crises, is there 
a gendered pattern of asset depletion; and 3) does asset depletion impact men and women 
differently in regards to their income earnings capabilities? Using a random sample of 
270 men and women drawn from “couples only” households in three, low-income 
communities in Bangkok, we discerned several gendered patterns of asset ownership 
including level, composition and use of these assets.  
 
Our study demonstrates that during periods of low incomes and/or high 
consumption needs, one can ascertain a gendered pattern of asset depletion for 
consumption smoothing purposes: women  tend to deplete their owned (or controlled) 
                                                 
10  The extent to which real assets actually serve as credit collateral suggests that there is possible 
endogeneity problem in Model III. Fortunately, the multi-purpose survey used in collecting the data 
included a credit (formal and informal) module. Our examination of the credit information for the same 
household sample shows that very few actually offer their real assets (e.g. jewelry, transport, appliance, etc) 
as collateral.  
  12assets more than men. This is supported by the Tobit test result, which shows that women 
in our household sample tend to deplete their assets at a faster rate than men by 26.3 
percentage points. The proxy variables for social/gender norms  also show that the rate of 
asset depletion increases significantly if  the earnings of the individual solely are used for 
household expenses and, to a lesser extent, if joint earnings are used. The results of the 
probit tests show that women are more likely to pawn a real asset as well as a business 
asset, compared to men. Finally, probit analysis was performed to examine the factors 
that may influence the probability of low profits (dependent variable). The results show 
that the value of depleted business assets and the value of total depleted real assets have a 
significant positive effect on the dependent variable, which points to the disproportionate 
impact depletion of (productive) assets has on the earnings potential of women as 
compared to men. This gendered outcome, we have suggested, is the result of the 
gendered nature of the economy ranging from the prevailing division of labor to the 
internalization of  norms. 
  
Our analysis of asset building and depletion among the poor indicates that the 
dynamics of poverty require a more comprehensive set of  policy measures so as to 
address directly  the structural conditions that cause these households to remain or 
become poor. Business asset ownership, much like land ownership, is  reversible.  
 
  For as long as macroeconomic conditions and economic policies help promote 
employment that is highly unstable and wages that can not meet subsistence 
requirements, the need to smoothen consumption will likely persist. This compels 
household members to pawn or sell their assets, including productive assets, thereby 
maintaining or increasing their vulnerability and making microlending schemes risky and 
unstable for the very poor, many of whom are women.  
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Table 1   
 
Participation Rate and Mean Total Assets  owned by Husband and Wife  
in Urban Poor Households, 
By Type of Asset and by Sex (Value  in Thai Baht)                   
 
 
  WOMEN               MEN           ALL 
 





















































35.2%  (95)  69,965 
(25,000) 









96.3% (130)  15,947 
(13,750) 
 









11.8%  (32)  11,906  
(4,000) 
 























7.4% (20)  394,500 
(200,000) 
 












Notes: a. The percentage of women in the total sample who  owned any real  asset six 
months ago ( beginning of specified time period). 
b. Exchange rate: 44 Thai baht = $1US. 
  17Table 2   
 
Pawning Rate and Mean Asset Depletion of Husband and Wife  
in Urban Poor Households, 
By Type of Pawned or Sold Asset (Value  in Thai Baht)                   
 
 
  WOMEN               MEN           ALL  Type of Pawned 





























1. Jewelry  24.4% (33)  13,166 
(6,000) 
8.9%   (12)   20,150 
(9,000) 






14.8% (20)  114,835 
(105,000) 
15.6% (21)  113,957 
(70,000) 
15.2%  (41)  114,385 
(90,000) 
3. Appliance  8.9%  (12)    7,158 
(4,750) 
8.9%  (12)    2,792 
(2,000) 
 8.9%  (24)    4,975 
(2,500) 
 
4. Business  14.8% (20)   15,040 
(0) 
0.7%   (1)   20,000 
(20,000) 
 7.8%  (21)  15,276 
(8,000) 
 




30.4% (41)  65,571 
(0) 
40% (108)  53,762 
(0) 
 
5. Land (rural)  1.5% (2)  50,000 
(50,000) 
 2.2%  (3)  136,667 
(60,000) 
 1.8% (5)  102,000 
(50,000) 
 
6. House  0       (0)   0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0) 
 
 
Notes: a. The percentage of women in the total sample who pawned or sold  their owned 
asset in the past six months. 










  18 
Table 3   
 
Mean Value of Pawned or Sold Asset  
by Purpose and By Household Member Sex (Value in Thai Baht) 
  
 
Purpose of Pawning or 
Selling of Asset (s) 
 
















33.3%  (45)  60,266  20.7 % (28)  88,396 




28.1% (38)  69,515  16.3% (22)  109, 313 




32.6 % (44)    64,536  17.8% (24)  102, 983 
4 Migration and other
e  
 






Note:   a ) Refers to the proportion of  wives in the total sample who have  sold or 
pawned their asset in the past six months. 
            b) Refers to food and other day-to-day household expenses. 
  c) Refers to tuition fees, uniforms, school contributions, books, transportation and 
other education expenses. 
  d) Refers to funeral, weddings, anniversaries, community, family and other 
special events. 
  e) Refers to expenses in obtaining visa, employment search, travel and other 
related migration expenses. 
 
  19Table 4  
 
Rate of Asset Depletion , by Sex of Owner 
 
Mean Rate of Depletion of  
Assets 
a





            22.37% 
 
          14.20% 
 Respondents who sold or 









Note: a)  This is calculated as: Pawned or Sold Real Assets Value   x 100 
     Total Owned Real Assets Value 
  20Table 5 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Tobit Model: Determinants of  Rate of Asset Depletion 
among Urban Poor Households (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Model  I 
 
Constant   -0.0549 (0.6086) 
 
Female 0.2634  (0.0891)*** 
 
Years of Schooling  -0.0054  (0.0123) 
 
Household  Educational Expenses  -0.0030   (0.0050) 
 
Earnings Share of Household Income   0.747  ( 0.0689) 
 
Private Transfers (remittances)  0.01  (0.0002) 
 
Joint Asset dummy  0.6424  (0.1103)*** 
 
Own Earnings for Household Expenses  0.3799  (0.1933)** 
 
Joint Earnings for Household Expenses    0.2786 (0.1494)** 
 
Community (Nomklao) dummy  0.0006   (0.0096) 
 




Sigma   0.5211  (0.0406) 
Log Likelihood  -157.954 
Chi-squared statistic   54.09*** 
 
***significant at 1% level 
** significant at 5% level 
  21Table 6 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Probit Model: Determinants of Pawning Probability among 
Urban Poor Workers (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Model  II 






Constant  -1.0256  (0.4012)***  -1.7710 (0.4562)*** 
 
Female dummy  0.6595  (0.2021)***  -0.4338 (0.2094)*** 
 
Years of Schooling  0.0062   (0.0283)   0.0432 (0.0289) 
 
Remittances   -0.0000  (0.0002) 
 
Vulnerable Job Dummy  -0.0042  (0.1826)   
 
Share of Household Earnings  0.2024  (0.1826)   
 
Number of Kids    -0.0605 (.0921) 
 
Own Business dummy    0.5360 (0.2665)*** 
 
Own Earnings for Household 
Expenses 
0.8163 (0.4480)*  0.7188 (0.5224) 
Joint Earnings for Household 
Expenses 
0.6576 (0.3458)*  0.75156 (0.4149)* 
Community (Nomklao) dummy 
 
0.1695 (0.2192)  0.5284 (0.2239)* 
Community (Udomsuk) dummy  0.2708 (0.2303) 
 
0.1779 (0.2588) 
    
 
 
Log Likelihood  -134.7243  -118.9985 
 
Chi-squared statistic  15.58**  24.96*** 
 
 
* significant at 10% level 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level  
  22Table 7 
 
Coefficient Estimates from Probit Model: Determinants of Low Profit Probability among 
Urban Poor Workers (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Model  IV 
Pr (Low Profits) 
 
Model V 
Pr (Low Profits) 
Constant  -1.1942 (1.1978)  -1.2426 (0.9172) 
Female dummy   0.7942 (0.8654)  -0.6123 (0.7241) 
Total Depleted Business Assets     0.0058 (0.0003)*    
Total Depleted Real Assets    0.0048 (0.0031)* 
Highly Informal Job Dummy     0.6196  (0.823)    0.4634 (0.7851) 
Years of Schooling    0.0467  (0.1105)   0.029  (0.0904) 
Number of Kids   -0.2281 (.4318)  -0.0793 (0.3464) 
Own Business dummy      1.6034 (1.085)  0.8199 (0.8121) 
Loan (first)  amount    -0.0000  (0.0000)  0.0000 (0.0000) 




Log Likelihood  -10.0373  -11.9396 
 
•  significant at 10% level 
  23Appendix A 
Selected Characteristics of Households 
 
  Household Type  Percentage   
     
          Couples only  5.45   
          Couples + dependents
1 55.45  
          Couples + dependents + non-dependents  10.91   
          Couples + non-dependents  14.55   
          Female headed
3 + dependents  13.64   
 Total  100.00   
     
     
     
     
  Sample Bangkok Community (low-income area sites)     
     
          Udomsuk (Thanin)   12.73   
          Nomkalo    45.45   
          Nawamin (Samukkee Patana)   41.82   
 Total  100.00   
     
Note.  
1. All children under 15 years, not in labor force, and sick or family members are considered dependents. 
2. Non-dependent members include those  who are 15 years old and older and in the labor force. 
3. The marital status of the household head can be either married, divorce, widow, or single. 
4. This refers to gross regular income measured in Thai baht from all sources, including   informal wage 
and salaries, business, government pension, subsidized money from any organizations and other sources. 
Intra-family transfers such as a housekeeping or personal allowance are not included. These income are 
calculated in monthly basis.    
 
Source of Thailand definition classification: Pichetpongsa (2004). 
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Selected Characteristics of Individual Respondents 
 
   Characteristics  Women  Men   
        
  Mean Age (in years)  40.5  43.1   
        
  Mean Years of Schooling  5.4  6.7   
        
  Mean Earnings (in Thai Baht)  4,885  7,969   
        
 
   Employment Status    Percentage   
        
           Regular   45.6  68.9   
           Sub-contracted, Casual or Temporary
1 19.7 4.5   
           Self-employed
2 33.9        25.6   
 Total  100.0  100.00  
        
 
 
Note: 1. This category  refers to those who produce a product (finished or partially-finished) or provide a 
service to a contractor or an employer but  select  their own work place. 
2. This refers to those engaged in their own  business e.g., food vending,  running a small grocery store, a 
barber shop, a beauty saloon, bike repairing, etc.   
 
 
 
  25